PROJECT OVERVIEW

Aristotle's concept of pleasure is built upon the notion of energeia (commonly translated as "activity" in current English translations of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics). In NE Book 7, Aristotle claims that pleasure is an energeia (NE 7.11 1153a18); in Book 10, he claims that pleasure supervenes on energeia. (NE 10.4 1174b32) My aim is to offer an interpretation of these claims, which avoids viewing Aristotle's account as merely anachronistic, while fully appreciating the philosophical importance of energeia within Aristotle's framework.

• Chapter 1: What Pleasure Is
  In Chapter 1, I argue that in Book 1.7-8, Aristotle presents the psychological basis for describing pleasure: pleasure is an activity (energeia) of the soul. This is not merely a weak claim suggesting that pleasure must be an experience of the soul provided that non-ensouled objects cannot experience pleasure. Rather, Aristotle’s thesis is that pleasure is an activity of the soul involving reason. Aristotle builds human actions, which include deliberation and decision, beliefs, and desires, upon this psychological basis—the activity of the soul involving reason. Pleasure, as one of the phenomena, is included in this framework. I acknowledge that, at this point, Aristotle provides what can be considered the “genus” of pleasure. To fully understand what pleasure is, we should further explore what distinguishes it from other psychological phenomena—the “differentia” of pleasure as an activity of the soul involving reason. I believe that this differentia can be found in Books 7 and 10, when we have a clear understanding on what energeia is in the discussion of pleasure.

• Chapter 2: Understanding Energeia

In Chapter 2, I turn to Aristotle’s Met. 9 to gain a conception of what energeia is. I will argue for a consistent interpretation of this notion throughout Met. 9. My aim is to demonstrate that in Met. 9.6 1048b18-35, the passage with the kinesis-energeia distinction—which shares many similarities with the distinction in the discussions of pleasure in Books 7 and 10—must be understood as describing the actuality of actions. I will also explain why Aristotle makes such a distinction specifically in that passage: to apply the minimum framework of the dunamis-energeia distinction to different existence of things. What we are told is that, in applying this framework, there are subtle adjustments can be made. For actions, there are actuality of actions that as an end by themselves, there are also actuality of actions that are considered processes toward other actualities.  

• Chapter 3: Energeia in NE

In Chapter 3, I apply this notion of energeia— the actuality of actions—to the NE, where energeia is used without a clear definition. I argue that this conception of energeia provides a better understanding of its use in different contexts in the NE, especially in discussions of pleasure. With this concept of energeia, Aristotle’s claims that pleasure is an energeia in Book 7 and that pleasure supervenes on energeia in Book 10 are telling that pleasure is part of the actuality of actions. When Aristotle clarifies that pleasure is a supervenient end, what he describes is that pleasure is an end of our actions. This clarification does not deviate from his view that pleasure is part of the actuality of actions. Although Aristotle explicitly highlights pleasure as a supervenient end only in Book 10, the idea that pleasure is an end of our actions is indicated in Book 7. 

• Chapter 4: Pleasure and Action

Once the notion of energeia is clarified as the actuality of actions in the discussion of pleasure, we can better understand the characteristics of pleasure given its relationship with energeia. In Chapter 4, I then turn to Aristotle’s detailed elaborations on pleasure as part of the actuality of actions and his objections to the kinesis-based view of pleasure. Besides the characteristic of pleasure as something that is complete, Aristotle argues that pleasure is unimpeded. The completeness of pleasure can be derived from its role as the end of the actions. The characteristic of being unimpeded, I believe, is what distinguishes pleasure from other psychological phenomena. Therefore, I conclude that pleasure is the unimpeded activity of the soul in actualizing actions. This means that, in performing various actions, which involve the activities of the soul with reason, pleasure represents not a different activity of the soul, but the kind of them when they are unimpeded.

• Chapter 5: Pleasure and Good

Finally, in Chapter 5, I turn to Aristotle’s view on whether pleasure is good. By being part of the actuality of actions, pleasure can be an end. The question remains: does it hold intrinsic value according to Aristotle’s ethical theory?  I argue that, according to Aristotle, pleasure is intrinsically good.  Its goodness stems from its nature as an unimpeded activity of the soul involving reason. I contend that this conception of the goodness of pleasure is consistent with Aristotle’s ethical theory, which builds value upon the function of human beings. Aristotle argues for the goodness of pleasure in both NE 7.11-15 and 10.1-5, while rejecting the notion of pleasure as the best good in NE 10.6-10. He asserts that pleasure is not the highest good and that happiness is not equivalent to pleasure. Aristotle’s refutation of pleasure as the highest good can be understood within the context of his eudaimonism. While affirming the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and its unfitting as the ultimate content of happiness, I leave open the interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonism. Instead, I provide elaborations on the normativity of pleasure as something inherently good. I argue that, according to Aristotle, in particular actions, we should aim to act not only virtuously but also pleasantly.